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Gordon: Texas Statutes Amended to Provide for Execution by Intravenous In

STATUTE NOTE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Capital Punishment-Texas Statutes
Amended to Provide for Execution by Intravenous
Injection of a Lethal Substance
Tex. Laws 1977, ch. 138, arts. 43.14 and 43.18, at 287-88.
On May 11, 1977, Texas became the second jurisdiction to provide statutorily for the execution of capital offenders by the intravenous injection of
a lethal substance.' The revised law provides that the executioner will no
longer be the Director of the Texas Department of Corrections, but rather
a designee of the Director.2
In order to withstand constitutional challenge, a statute prescribing a
method of execution must not be vague, 3 violate the prohibition against ex
post facto legislation,4 nor allow cruel and unusual punishment.5 A statute
is not unconstitutionally vague, generally, if its provisions are definite
enough to be understood and consistently applied.' A law is ex post facto
only when it creates or aggravates a crime, changes the rules of evidence,
or increases the punishment for an activity which has already been performed.7 As to the third potential challenge, courts have had difficulty in
1. Tex. Laws 1977, ch. 138, art. 43.14, at 287 provides that the sentence of death be
executed "by intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient
to cause death and until such convict is dead, such execution procedure to be determined
and supervised by the Director of the Department of Corrections." A similar law was enacted
in Oklahoma one day earlier. See 1977 Okla. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 41, § 1014, at 89-90.
2. The law provides that "[tihe Director of the Texas Department of Corrections shall
designate an executioner to carry out the death penalty provided by law." Tex. Laws 1977,
ch. 138, art. 43.18, at 288.
3. See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950); Texas
Liquor Control Bd. v. Attic Club, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Tex. 1970); Ex parte Halsted, 182
S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
5. The eighth amendment provides that "[excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII. The Supreme Court in Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947), held that "[tihe
cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the
method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to
extinguish life humanely." Accord, Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1968). See generally
Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79
HAiv. L. REv. 635 (1966).
6. Ex parte Halsted, 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944); see American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950); Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Attic Club,
Inc., 457 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Tex. 1970).
7. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389 (1798); cf. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 138 (1810) (law which punished act not punishable when committed declared ex
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precisely defining the parameters of the eighth amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.' The United States Supreme
Court, however, has consistently held that the imposition of the death
penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment per se,9 and Texas courts
have been in accord with this position. 0 To be considered violative of the
eighth amendment, the means used to impose death must be "inhuman
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.""
This prohibition historically encompassed various types of torturous punishment 2 as well as any method calculated to cause unnecessary pain or a
lingering death. 3
Prior to 1923 the prescribed method of execution of capital offenders in
Texas was hanging. 4 In 1923 the Texas Legislature, in an attempt to supplant an antiquated system of inflicting death with one it deemed more
humane, 5 chose to incorporate electrocution as the state's new mode of
capital punishment. The legislature also designated the warden of the
state penitentiary as executioner and further specified his replacement
should he be unable to perform his duties. 7 Although minor changes were
made concerning these procedures after 1923,18 electrocution remained the
post facto); Graham v. Thompson, 246 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1957) (law which changed or
increased punishment for act previously committed declared ex post facto); Johnson v. Morris, 557 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Wash. 1976) (en banc) (law which inflicted greater punishment for
crime than that annexed to crime when committed declared ex post facto).
8. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258 (1972) (concurring opinion); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878).
9. See, e.g.,
Gregg v. Georgia, U.S. .,
-,
96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L. Ed. 2d
859, 882-83 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, U.S.
96 S. Ct. 2950, 2954, 49 L. Ed. 2d
929, 936 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, U.S ....
96 S. Ct. 2960, 2964, 49 L. Ed. 2d
913, 920 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241 (1972) (concurring opinion); In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1878).
10. See, e.g.,
Livingston v. State, 542 S.W.2d 655, 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Cherry
v. State, 488 S.W.2d 744, 755 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 909 (1972); David
v. State, 453 S.W.2d 172, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
11. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); accord, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 370 (1910).
12. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 77 Mo. 310, 312-13 (1883) (drawing and quartering,
cutting off ears and limbs, burning alive, starvation, boiling alive); In re Calhoun, 94 N.E.2d
388, 391 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949) (drawing and quartering, cutting off ears and limbs, disemboweling); Hart v. Commonwealth, 109 S.E. 582, 587 (Va. 1921) (drawing and quartering).
13. See Estelle v. Gamble, U.S. -__,
,97 S. Ct. 285, 290, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251,
259 (1976); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135
(1878).
14. An Act Punishing Crimes and Misdemeanors, § 52 (1836), 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TExAs 1254-55 (1898).
15. See Tex. Laws, 2d Spec. Seass. 1923, ch. 51, § 14, at 113-14.
16. See id.§ 1, at 111.
17. Id. § 2, at 111.
18. See, e.g.,
Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 341, § 6, at 911 (changing executioner); Tex. Laws 1965,
ch. 722, art. 43.18, at 507 (changing executioner); Tex. Laws 1951, ch. 423, § 1, at 772
(changing executioner).
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method of imposing the death penalty in Texas from its initial authorization to the present."9
Recently the Texas Legislature again changed the method of imposing
the death penalty. The amended statute provides that death shall be
caused by the intravenous injection of a lethal substance."0 The person
designated as executioner has also been changed to allow the Director of
the Texas Department of Corrections to appoint an executioner to administer the lethal dose." l
The legislation changing the manner of execution was introduced primarily because of a belief by proponents that death by lethal injection is
more humane and more dignified than death by electrocution. Opposition
to the amendment, however, was based primarily upon a conviction that
capital punishment imposed by any method, including lethal injection, is
cruel and unusual, 3 although other reasons for opposition were cited.24
While it is unclear whether lethal injection is in fact cruel and unusual,
the characterization of all forms of capital punishment as cruel and unusual appears erroneous in light of the numerous decisions upholding death
as a constitutionally permissible punishment.2"
Any criminal law, in order to be valid, must not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation." In an early decision
the Supreme Court defined an ex post facto law as "one which renders an
act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when . . .
committed." 7 The Court retreated somewhat from this position in Rooney
5
where it held that a change in the manner or extent of
v. North Dakota,"
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.14 (1966).
20. Tex. Laws 1977, ch. 138, art. 43.14, at 287.
21. Id. art. 43.18, at 288.
22. Interview with Ben Z. Grant, Member, Texas House of Representatives and sponsor
of H.B. 945, by telephone, in Marshall, Texas (July 26, 1977).
23. H.B. 945 on Third Reading, TEX. H.R.J. 1918 (1977) (Representative George Leland's
disapproval of capital punishment in any form); Interview with Joe L. Hernandez, Member,
Texas House of Representatives, by telephone, in San Antonio, Texas (July 26, 1977); Interview with Lou Nelle Sutton, Member, Texas House of Representatives, by telephone, in San
Antonio, Texas (July 26, 1977); Interview with Ron Waters, Member, Texas House of Representatives, by telephone, in Houston, Texas (July 26, 1977).
24. Interview with T.H. McDonald, Sr., Member, Texas House of Representatives, by
telephone, in Mesquite, Texas (July 26, 1977) (stating lethal injection not sufficiently severe
punishment for those who have committed violent crimes); Interview with Ron Wilson, Member, Texas House of Representatives, by telephone, in Houston, Texas (July 26, 1977) (stating
fear that juries may hand down more death sentences under new law).
25. See cases cited note 9 supra.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. In Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) the Supreme
Court stated that "a law is ex post facto only where it creates or aggravates the crime or
increases the punishment or changes the rules of evidence for the purpose of conviction." Id.
at 390-91 (emphasis added).
27. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810).
28. 196 U.S. 319 (1905).

19. See TEX.
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punishment is not ex post facto when the punishment is mitigated by the
change or if the change is of no practical consequence to the prisoner." This
principle was subsequently applied to a case dealing specifically with a
change in the mode of execution in Malloy v. South Carolina.30 There the
Court held that the prohibition against ex post facto legislation does not
apply to the "mere alteration in conditions deemed necessary for the orderly infliction of humane punishment."'3 ' Further it noted that producing
death by electocution rather than by hanging did not increase the punishment and therefore was not unconstitutional under the ex post facto prohibition of the Federal Constitution.3 1 In Ex parte Johnson31 the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, citing the decision in Malloy, held that a criminal
convicted and sentenced to die by hanging could instead be electrocuted
without violating the ex post facto provision of the Constitution.3 4 The
court stated further that the use of the phrase "by hanging until dead"
recited during sentencing was merely surplusage and therefore did not
explicitly require that the sentence of death be carried out in that manner. 5 Thus, it appears reasonable to conclude from a logical extension of
the Malloy and Johnson holdings that execution by lethal injection may
be imposed upon a criminal sentenced to die by electrocution without
violating the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation.
A statute may be deemed unconstitutionally vague unless its provisions
are readily susceptible to a definite understanding and application.3 1 While
absolute clarity is not required, a reasonable degree of certainty is necessary in order to prevent the invalidation of the statute because of unconstitutional vagueness. 37 The new capital punishment statute in Texas authorizes the intravenous injection of a lethal substance,38 but neither the exact
substance to be injected nor the procedures surrounding the administration of the lethal dose are expressly set forth.3" Where similar wording has
29. Id. at 326.
30. 237 U.S. 180 (1915).
31. Id. at 183.
32. Id. at 184-85; accord, Hernandez v. State, 32 P.2d 18, 24 (Ariz. 1934); Woo Dak San
v. State, 7 P.2d 940, 941 (N.M. 1931); State ex rel. Pierre v. Jones, 9 So. 2d 42, 46 (La.), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 633 (1942); State v. Gee Jon, 211 P. 676, 681 (Nev. 1923); Hill v. State, 146
Tex. Crim. 333, 171 S.W.2d 880 (1943); McInturf v. State, 20 Tex. Crim. 335, 353 (1886).
33. 96 Tex. Crim. 473, 258 S.W. 473 (1924).
34. Id. at 474-75, 258 S.W. at 473.
35. Id. at 474, 258 S.W. at 473.
36. Ex parte Halsted, 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944); see American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950); Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Attic Club,
Inc., 457 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Tex. 1970).
37. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952); see Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir.
1977).
38. Tex. Laws 1977, ch. 138, art. 43.14, at 287-88.
39. See id. at 287-88.
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been used in statutes authorizing death by the administration of a lethal
gas,' several courts have held that such wording is not unconstitutionally
vague merely because the exact substance and procedures are not specified
in the statute." In State v. Gee Jon" the Nevada Supreme Court conceded
that a gas could be selected which would produce a painful death. It was
assumed, however, that "the officials entrusted with the infliction of the
death penalty by the use of gas will administer a gas which will produce
no such results, and will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.", 3 The
court noted that to invalidate a law merely because the possibility existed
that a pain-producing gas might be selected would effectively limit the role
modern science plays in the search for a more humane method of execution." This same rationale has been exhibited by the California courts, and
the United States Supreme Court has refused to rule that the California
statute is unconstitutionally vague.' 5 Since a similar challenge to the new
Texas injection statute would be one of first impression, it is only speculation as to what the courts may decide.
Although intravenous injection of a lethal substance has never been
authorized as a means of execution in the United States, it does not appear
that this method will be deemed violative of the eighth amendment merely
because it is new and unusual. Previous changes in the mode of execution
have been evaluated by an "evolving standard of decency" in light of
public opinion and social progress." So long as the manner of execution is
not deemed inhumane and barbarous, the fact that it has never been used
before does not make it "unusual" as forbidden by the Constitution.,,
40. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604 (Deering 1971); NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.355(1) (1973).
41. In re Anderson, 447 P.2d 117, 130, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 34 (1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 971 (1972); People v. Daugherty, 256 P.2d 911, 922-23 (Cal.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
827 (1953); State v. Gee Jon, 211 P. 676; 682 (Nev. 1923). There are no cases that indicate a
contrary result.
42. 211 P. 676 (Nev. 1923).
43. Id. at 682.
44. Id. at 682.
45. See In re Anderson, 447 P.2d 117, 130, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 34 (1968), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 971 (1972); People v. Daugherty, 256 P.2d 911, 922-23 (Cal.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827
(1953).
46. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The phrase cruel and unusual "must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." Id. at 101; accord, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). What is cruel and
unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
.. 97
U.S..enlightened by a humane justice:" Id. at.378; see Estelle v. Gamble, S. Ct. 285, 290, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 258-59 (1976).
47. See In re Storti, 60 N.E. 210, 210-11 (Mass. 1901).
When . . . the means adop'ted [to adminster the death penalty] are chosen with...
intent, and are devised for the purpose of reaching the end proposed as swiftly and
painlessly as possible, . . . they are not forbidden by the constitution, although they
should be discoveries of recent science and never should have been heard of before. . . . The word "unusual" . . . cannot be taken so broadly as to prohibit every
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The eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is directed generally at the method and kind of punishment imposed." Since death is a constitutionally permissible type of punishment,"
the constitutionality of this new method of execution in Texas will likely
depend upon the procedures and substances used to administer the sentence.5 ' The substance and procedures selected to perform the execution
must not inflict undue pain or cause a lingering death in order to withstand
the expected eighth amendment challenge.51 The substance selected by the
Department of Corrections to serve as the lethal dose is sodium thiopental. 2 Several medical experts have exhibited a belief that death by intravenous injection of this substance or a similar barbituate will be swift53 and
painless. 4 It appears, therefore, that the new statute will be within the
acceptable criteria of the eighth amendment so long as sodium thiopental
humane improvement not previously known ...
Id. at 210-11.
48. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1968); Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
464 (1947). Recent Supreme Court decisions have expanded the scope of the eighth amendment to protect against the arbitrary and capricious actions of juries in death penalty cases.
, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976); Jurek v.
U.S. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, , 96 S. Ct. 2950, 49 L. Ed. 2d 949 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
Texas, - U.S. 238 (1972).
49. See cases cited note 9 supra.
50. See Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) where the Court stated "[tihe
cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the
" Id. at 464.
method of punishment ..
51. See cases cited notes 12-13 supra.
52. Interview with Ron Taylor, Spokesman for the Texas Department of Corrections, by
telephone, in Huntsville, Texas (Sept 8, 1977). "Sodium Thiopental is an ultrashort-acting
depressant of the central nervous system which induces hypnosis and anesthesia, but not
analgesia. It produces hypnosis within 30 to 40 seconds of intravenous injection." PHYSICIANS'
DESK REFERENCE at 540 (30th ed. 1976). See generally R. DRIPPS, J. ECKENHOFF & L. VANDAM,
INTRODUCTION TO ANESTHESIA: THE PRINCIPLES OF SAFE PRACTICE 179-184 (3rd ed. 1967).
53. One physician estimated that unconsciousness would occur within a matter of seconds with death occurring a few minutes thereafter. Interview with Dr. Roy Chapman, Oklahoma State Medical Examiner, by telephone, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (July 27, 1977).
Another physician estimated that unconsciousness would occur within three to five seconds
and death would follow within two to four minutes. Interview with Dr. Charles A. Walton,
Assistant Dean for Clinical Programs, University of Texas Health Science Center at San
Antonio, by telephone, in San Antonio, Texas (July 28, 1977). An extensive British study
indicated that death would occur within one to two minutes. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 257 (1953).
54. Dr. Roy Chapman believes that death by injection would be like "drawing a curtain"
with no discomfort whatsoever. Interview with Dr. Roy Chapman, Oklahoma State Medical
Examiner, by telephone, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (July 27, 1977). Dr. Charles A. Walton
stated a belief that the subject would feel nothing at all. Interview with Dr. Charles A.
Walton, Assistant Dean for Clinical Programs, University of Texas Health Science Center at
San Antonio, by telephone, in San Antonio, Texas (July 28, 1977). The British survey indicated that the subject would feel nothing after the prick of the needle. ROYAL COMMISSION ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 257 (1953).
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or a drug exhibiting similar characteristics is used.
An additional problem which may confront those selected to administer
the lethal dose concerns the difficulty with the procedure of venipuncture
itself. Often venipuncture is difficult and, in some instances, impossible
when the person to be injected possesses certain physical abnormalities.5
This problem may be overcome, however, by surgically exposing the vein
with little or no pain to the subject.5" At least one physician has expressed
doubts as to whether a doctor could perform this surgery without violating
the Hippocratic oath." If the surgery could not be performed and venipuncture therefore was infeasible, execution of the convict under the new
statute would be impossible since no alternative to intravenous injection
is provided.58
It appears certain that the substance selected to extinguish life under
the new statute will guarantee a swift and painless death. There is little
doubt, therefore, that the statute will fall well within the acceptable criteria of the eighth amendment. Furthermore, in light of the decisions in
Malloy and Johnson, death row inmates originally sentenced to die by
electrocution may now be executed by lethal injection without violating
the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation. One viable
challenge, however, may be on the grounds that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. If Texas courts follow the lead of Nevada and California in
their interpretation of the statute, such a challenge clearly will fail.
John H. Gordon, Jr.
55. The Royal Commission stated that physical abnormalities such as flat veins or fat
covered veins would make venipuncture difficult in 1 in 500 cases and impossible in 1 in 3000.
ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

258 (1953). Dr. Walton stated that aside from the

abnormalities mentioned by the Royal Commission's report, trauma caused by the prisoner's
surroundings might cause dehydration and consequently make venipuncture extremely difficult. Interview with Dr. Charles A. Walton, Assistant Dean for Clinical Programs, University
of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio, by telephone, in San Antonio, Texas (July
28, 1977).
56. Dr. Walton stated that this surgery, known as a "cut-down procedure" is often used
when venipuncture of hospital patients becomes difficult. Interview with Dr. Charles A.
Walton, Assistant Dean for Clinical Programs, University of Texas Health Science Center at
San Antonio, by telephone, in San Antonio, Texas (July 28, 1977).
57. Id.
58. See Tex. Laws 1977, ch. 138, art. 43.14., at 287.
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